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ARTICLES 
ARBITRATION PROVISIONS:  LITTLE DARLINGS 




This Article takes a new approach to resolving the growing tension 
between the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the unconscionability 
doctrine.  While arbitration provisions are favored under the FAA, they are 
viewed far more skeptically by courts applying unconscionability to refuse 
enforcement of one-sided arbitration provisions.  This tension, which has 
increased dramatically in recent years, represents a major fault line in 
contract law.  Jurisprudence and commentary on this issue have assumed 
that courts have the authority to apply the unconscionability doctrine to 
arbitration provisions.  This Article refutes that assumption, taking the 
position that Congress, in passing the FAA, removed from the courts the 
power to use unconscionability to deny enforcement of arbitration 
provisions.  This argument is based on the language and structure of the 
FAA, the FAA’s legislative history, commentary contemporaneous with the 
passage of the FAA, and the nature of unconscionability.  To the extent it is 
necessary to protect vulnerable parties from one-sided arbitration 
provisions, judicial application of the unconscionability doctrine cannot be 
the solution.  This Article suggests that the arbitration system itself may be 
capable of addressing any such overreaching. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the eyes of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),1 arbitration provisions 
are “little darlings”—favored contract terms presumptively entitled to full 
enforcement.  To courts applying the unconscionability doctrine, however, 
such provisions are often viewed as “little monsters.”  Three developments 
have brought the FAA’s pro-arbitration policy into conflict with 
unconscionability’s more skeptical outlook.  First, the United States 
Supreme Court has steadily expanded the scope of the FAA.2  Second, 
arbitration provisions have become increasingly common in employment 
and consumer contracts.3  And, third, parties with stronger bargaining 
power have become more brazen about drafting arbitration provisions to 
favor their own interests.4  The Supreme Court recently had an opportunity 
to resolve the conflict,5 but left things only slightly less confused than 
before.6
Jurisprudence and commentary to date have assumed that courts have the 
authority to use the unconscionability doctrine to refuse to enforce one-
sided arbitration provisions.  This Article challenges that assumption and 
takes the position that Congress, in passing the FAA, intended to strip 
courts of that power.  This Article puts forward a number of arguments to 
support the position that courts should not use unconscionability as a tool to 
assess arbitration provisions.  First, in passing the FAA, Congress made a 
meta-determination that arbitration agreements, as a class, are beyond 
judicial skepticism.  They are, at least as far as the courts should be 
concerned, “pre-approved.”  Thus, even a badly one-sided arbitration 





 1. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006). 
 of a court (or if it does, the court must not be so 
 2. See infra notes 30–34 and accompanying text. 
 3. See infra notes 62–63 and accompanying text. 
 4. See infra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 5. See Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010). 
 6. See discussion infra Part I.C.2. 
 7. See infra note 51 and accompanying text. 
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darn sensitive).  The legislative history and commentary contemporaneous 
with the passage of the legislation establish this point. 
Second, the structure of the FAA demonstrates that Congress intended to 
remove discretionary doctrines, such as unconscionability, from the tools 
available to courts to police arbitration provisions.  The FAA simply does 
not contemplate an unconscionability analysis; to the contrary, the structure 
of the FAA excludes it, replacing it with only a limited review after the 
arbitrators’ award. 
Third, while the Supreme Court has indicated that the triumvirate of 
fraud, duress, and unconscionability are state law doctrines of general 
applicability that can be applied to arbitration provisions without running 
afoul of the FAA,8 this Article takes the position that because 
unconscionability is, in key relevant ways, different from fraud and duress, 
courts should not apply unconscionability to arbitration provisions.  For 
instance, while fraud and duress go to the “making of the arbitration 
agreement”9
Concluding that courts should not apply unconscionability to arbitration 
provisions does not constitute a dismissal of the importance of the 
unconscionability doctrine in general.  While the FAA may suspend the 
ability of courts to apply unconscionability in this context, the doctrine still 
remains the law and there is no impediment to arbitrators applying the 
doctrine.  This leads to one final question:  can we trust the arbitrators with 
this job?  The most accurate answer is probably “we’ll see,” but there are at 
least some hopeful signs. 
 (and hence are within the scope of matters to be addressed by a 
court), unconscionability goes to “what the arbitration agreement is made 
of,” a question that is properly addressed by the arbitrator. 
The Article proceeds as follows:  Part I provides an overview of the 
FAA, the unconscionability doctrine, and, most importantly, the interaction 
between them.  Part II puts forward several arguments that support the 
proposition that unconscionability should not be used by courts to assess 
arbitration provisions.  Finally, Part III addresses the question of whether, if 
we put courts out of the unconscionability business, arbitrators are up to the 
task of policing arbitration provisions. 
I.  BRIEF BACKGROUND ON THE FAA AND THE UNCONSCIONABILITY 
DOCTRINE 
A.  The FAA 
The Supreme Court often seems torn when it comes to how courts should 
treat arbitration provisions compared to how they treat other types of 
contract provisions.  Consider the following statement:  “[s]ection 2 [of the 
FAA] embodies the national policy favoring arbitration and places 
 
 8. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. at 2776; Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686 
(1996). 
 9. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006). 
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arbitration agreements on equal footing with all other contracts.”10  On the 
one hand, the Court seems to be saying that arbitration provisions are to be 
treated just like other contract provisions (that is, no better and no worse).  
But if that is the case, how is there a federal policy “favoring” arbitration, 
since “to favor” implies giving one thing preferential treatment over 
another?  There cannot be both equality and favoritism.  The current status 
of arbitration provisions is probably akin to that of the pigs in George 
Orwell’s Animal Farm—all contract provisions are equal, but some (like 
arbitration provisions) are more equal than others.11
In 1925 Congress passed the United States Arbitration Act,
  A quick review of the 
FAA shows how we got to this point. 
12 as the FAA 
was originally titled, to overcome prior judicial hostility towards pre-
dispute arbitration agreements.13  That judicial hostility was reflected in 
common law rules that rendered pre-dispute arbitration provisions of little 
use.  Under those common law rules, courts permitted either party to a pre-
dispute arbitration agreement to revoke the agreement at any time before 
the entry of an award.14  Further, although arbitration agreements were 
deemed technically valid, courts typically refrained from enforcing them in 
equity, refusing to stay litigation or order the parties to proceed to 
arbitration.15
Dissatisfaction with these common law rules (often referred to 
collectively as the “rule of revocability”
 
16), mostly in commercial circles, 
led to a strong movement to undo such rules legislatively.  Efforts, initially 
led by the New York State Chamber of Commerce, resulted in the passage 
of the New York Arbitration Law in 1920.17
 
 10. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006). 
  The New York Arbitration 
Law reversed the judicial hostility towards arbitration provisions, 
mandating that a “provision in a written contract to settle by arbitration a 
controversy thereafter arising between the parties . . . shall be valid, 
enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
 11. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 149 (Harcourt Brace & Co. 1995) (1945) (“All 
animals are equal but some animals are more equal than others.”). 
 12. ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16). 
 13. See H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1–2 (1924) (noting that the “need for the law arises from 
an anachronism of our American law” reflecting a judicial hostility towards arbitration 
agreements); S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2–3 (1924) (describing the judicial hostility that the 
United States Arbitration Act was intended to correct). 
 14. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 32 (1984) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
 15. See S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2 (“[I]t is very old law that the performance of a written 
agreement to arbitrate would not be enforced in equity, and that if an action at law were 
brought on the contract containing the agreement to arbitrate, such agreement could not be 
pleaded in bar of the action.”). 
 16. WESLEY A. STURGES, A TREATISE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND AWARDS 45 
(1930). 
 17. Julius Henry Cohen, The Law of Commercial Arbitration and the New York Statute, 
31 YALE L.J. 147, 147–48 (1921) (describing efforts leading up to passage of the New York 
Arbitration Law). 
2011] LITTLE DARLINGS AND LITTLE MONSTERS 2039 
equity for the revocation of any contract.”18  The New York Arbitration 
Law thus “abrogate[d] an ancient rule”19
Federal legislation modeled on the New York Arbitration Law followed 
within a few years.  The FAA, like the New York Arbitration Law, was 
passed to reverse legislatively the judicial rule of revocability
—the rule of revocability. 
20 and to 
“replace judicial indisposition to arbitration with a ‘national policy favoring 
[it].’”21  Accordingly, the FAA “declares simply that . . . agreements for 
arbitration shall be enforced, and provides a procedure . . . for their 
enforcement.”22
Section 2 of the FAA (section 2), the FAA’s “centerpiece provision,”
 
23 
states that a “written provision in any . . . contract evidencing a transaction 
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising 
out of such contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save 
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.”24  The FAA also provides a mechanism for the specific 
enforcement by courts of arbitration provisions.  Section 3 of the FAA 
(section 3) empowers (actually, it requires) a court to stay litigation when a 
lawsuit has been brought over an issue covered by a valid arbitration 
agreement.25  And section 4 of the FAA (section 4) requires a court, once 
satisfied that an arbitration agreement has been made and that one of the 
parties has refused to arbitrate, to order the parties to proceed to arbitration 
in accordance with the terms of the agreement.26  The FAA provides 
limited grounds for vacating27 or modifying28 the award of the arbitrators.29
The FAA’s importance has been magnified by the fact that the Supreme 
Court has greatly expanded the scope of the FAA.  For instance, the Court 
has held that Congress intended the FAA to extend to the full limit of 
Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.
 
30  The Court has also 
held that the FAA applies in state as well as federal courts,31
 
 18. Act of Apr. 19, 1920, ch. 275, 1920 N.Y. Laws 803, reprinted in part in STURGES, 
supra note 
 that the FAA 
16, at 92 (current version codified as amended at N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 7501–14 
(MCKINNEY 2011)). 
 19. Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 130 N.E. 288, 289 (N.Y. 1921). 
 20. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 21. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1402 (2008) (quoting 
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006)). 
 22. H.R. REP. NO. 68–96, at 2 (1924). 
 23. Vaden v. Discover Bank, 129 S. Ct. 1262, 1274 (2009) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 24. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 25. Id. § 3. 
 26. Id. § 4. 
 27. Id. § 10. 
 28. Id. § 11. 
 29. I discuss this point more fully later in the Article. See infra notes 175–87 and 
accompanying text. 
 30. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273–74 (1995); see also 
Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 55 (2003) (rejecting requirement that activity 
must have a “substantial effect on interstate commerce” to be covered by the FAA). 
 31. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1984). 
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applies to employment contracts32 (despite some ambiguous language in the 
statute33), and that, with some possible exceptions, the FAA applies to 
agreements to arbitrate statutory claims.34
The Court has also reduced the applicability of state law to arbitration 
provisions, and the scope of this reduction is crucial to understanding the 
role of unconscionability in the policing of arbitration provisions.  Section 2 
does carve out a role for state law, providing for the enforceability of 
written arbitration provisions “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract.”
 
35  The Court has made clear that 
state law may be applied “if that law arose to govern issues concerning the 
validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally.”36  The 
Court has even gone so far as to twice identify unconscionability as one of 
the grounds referred to in section 2.37
On the other hand, the Court has also stated: 
 
What States may not do is decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce 
all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its 
arbitration clause.  The Act makes any such state policy unlawful, for that 
kind of policy would place arbitration clauses on an unequal “footing,” 
directly contrary to the Act’s language and Congress’ intent.38
This language seems to say that while a contract containing an arbitration 
clause can be unenforceable, the arbitration provision itself cannot be 
considered as part of that judicial determination. 
 
These seemingly conflicting statements from the Court have left the 
status and role of unconscionability unsettled.  I return to this point below 
when I discuss the encounter between unconscionability and the FAA over 
the proper regulation of arbitration provisions.39
B.  Unconscionability 
  But first I provide an 
overview of the doctrine of unconscionability. 
The Supreme Court had an opportunity to clarify the relationship 
between unconscionability, arbitration provisions, and the FAA in the 
recent case Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson,40
 
 32. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001). 
 an opinion I will address 
in more detail shortly.  During oral argument Justice Breyer asked one of 
the attorneys the following crucial questions:  “What is the underlying 
rationale in contract law of setting aside contracts as unconscionable?  Why 
 33. The statute excludes from its coverage “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad 
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in . . . interstate commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 1. 
 34. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (“It is by now 
clear that statutory claims may be the subject of an arbitration agreement, enforceable 
pursuant to the FAA.”). 
 35. 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 36. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686–87 (1996) (quoting Perry v. 
Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987)). 
 37. See infra notes 79–91 and accompanying text.  
 38. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995). 
 39. See discussion infra Part I.C.2. 
 40. 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010). 
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do courts do it?  What’s the theory?  I would like to know that.”41
Most law-trained readers are quite familiar with modern 
unconscionability as articulated in the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) 
and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (Restatement).  Section 2-302 of 
the U.C.C. provides: 
  In this 
section of the Article I attempt to provide a very brief response to the 
questions posed by Justice Breyer. 
 (1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the 
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court 
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the 
contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the 
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable 
result. 
 (2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any 
clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a 
reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, 
purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination.42




If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is 
made a court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the 
remainder of the contract without the unconscionable term, or may so 
limit the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any 
unconscionable result.
 and nearly identical to section 2-302(1) of the U.C.C., providing 
that: 
44
Neither the U.C.C. nor the Restatement defines unconscionability, but 
most courts continue to require a showing of both procedural 
unconscionability (which goes to the manner in which the bargain was 
formed) and substantive unconscionability (which goes to the one-sidedness 
of the contract terms involved).
 
45  However, many courts take other 
approaches, such as requiring only substantive unconscionability.46
 
 41. Transcript of Oral Argument at 49, Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 
2772 (2010) (No. 09-497), 2010 WL 1654083 at *48. 
  Even 
among courts that do adhere to the procedural/substantive unconscionability 
 42. U.C.C. § 2-302 (2002). 
 43. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208, reporter’s note (1981) (noting 
that the description of unconscionability follows U.C.C. § 2-302). 
 44. Id. § 208. 
 45. See JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 96(B)(2)(b) (4th ed. 
2001). 
 46. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 59–60 (Ariz. 1995) 
(indicating substantive unconscionability alone may be sufficient for a finding of 
unconscionability); Ahern v. Knecht, 563 N.E.2d 787, 792 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (gross 
excessiveness of price alone is sufficient for unconscionability); Brower v. Gateway 2000, 
Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 574–75 (App. Div. 1998) (indicating substantive unconscionability 
alone may be sufficient for a finding of unconscionability); cf. March v. Tysinger Motor Co., 
No. 3:07-CV-508, 2007 WL 4358339, at *4 n.5 (E.D. Va. Dec. 12, 2007) (noting that 
Virginia law on unconscionability does not include the procedural/substantive dichotomy). 
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requirement, there is a difference of opinion as to whether the mere use of a 
contract of adhesion gives rise, by itself, to procedural unconscionability.47
Beyond the basic framework, things become even more unsettled.  
Because unconscionability is not defined, it has been described as 
“amorphous”
 
48 and “chameleon-like.”49  A few formulations seem to recur.  
For instance, courts frequently describe unconscionability as existing in the 
case of contracts that “no man in his senses and not under delusion would 
make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the 
other.”50  Other courts have described unconscionable contracts or terms as 
being those that “shock the conscience.”51  Another standard provides that 
unconscionability involves a finding of “an absence of meaningful choice” 
coupled with contract terms that are “unreasonably favorable” to the 
stronger party.52
Of course, U.C.C. section 2-302 was drafted after the passage of the 
FAA.  But the doctrine of unconscionability was well established by the 
 
 
 47. Compare Clerk v. First Bank of Del., No. 09-5121, 2010 WL 1253578, at *9 (E.D. 
Pa. Mar. 22, 2010) (“Procedural unconscionability is generally found where the agreement is 
a contract of adhesion.”), and Flores v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376, 
382 (Ct. App. 2001) (stating that “[a] finding of a contract of adhesion is essentially a 
finding of procedural unconscionability”), with Bhim v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 
2d 1307, 1313 n.3 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (indicating mere fact that a contract is an “adhesion 
contract” is not by itself sufficient to establish procedural unconscionability under Florida 
law).  
 48. See, e.g., Farmers Auto. Ins. Ass’n v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 2008 WI App 116, ¶ 32, 
313 Wis. 2d 93, 756 N.W.2d 461.  
 49. Steinhardt v. Rudolph, 422 So. 2d 884, 890 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). 
 50. This is the formulation used in a leading mid-eighteenth century English case on 
unconscionability, Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, (1750) 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100(Ch.); 2 Ves. 
Sen. 125, 155.  This formulation, or variations on it, is still quite common. See, e.g., Am. 
Bottling Co. v. Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P., No. 09C-02-134 WCC, 2009 WL 3290729, 
at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2009) (noting that in Delaware the traditional test for 
unconscionability is whether a contract is “‘such as no man in his senses and not under 
delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest or fair man would accept, on the 
other’” (quoting Tulowitzki v. Atl. Richfield Co., 396 A.2d 956, 960 (Del. 1978))); Stream 
v. Grow, No. 09-1011, 2010 WL 1578233, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2010) (an 
agreement is unconscionable if it is “‘such as no man in his senses and not under delusion 
would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other’” 
(quoting Casey v. Lupkes, 286 N.W.2d 204, 207 (Iowa 1979))); Cioffi-Petrakis v. Petrakis, 
898 N.Y.S.2d 861, 861 (App. Div. 2010) (“‘An unconscionable bargain is one which no 
person in his or her senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and no 
honest and fair person would accept on the other, the inequality being so strong and manifest 
as to shock the conscience . . . .’” (quoting Morad v. Morad, 812 N.Y.S.2d 126, 127 (App. 
Div. 2006))). 
 51. See, e.g., Harrington v. Atl. Sounding Co., 602 F.3d 113, 125 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(substantive unconscionability exists only if the agreement “shocks the court’s conscience”); 
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that 
substantive unconscionability requires that an agreement’s terms are “so one-sided as to 
shock the conscience”); Oesterle v. Atria Mgmt. Co., No. 09-4010-JAR, 2009 WL 2043492, 
at *3 (D. Kan. July 14, 2009) (unconscionability requires that a court find the contract 
provision at issue so outrageous and unfair as to “shock[] the conscience”). 
 52. This standard was articulated in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 
445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965), and has been described by a leading treatise as a “durable” 
standard. E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.28, at 301 (4th ed. 2004). 
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time of the passage of the FAA53
So, what is the response to Justice Breyer’s inquiry as to the “underlying 
rationale” of unconscionability and why courts refuse to fully enforce 
unconscionable contracts?  In my view, there are two fundamental 
rationales:  (1) the protection of parties with weak bargaining power from 
contractual overreaching by those with stronger bargaining power, and (2) 
the preservation of judicial integrity.  With respect to this latter point, I 
mean that courts do not want to serve as tools of injustice and will not lend 
their active assistance, by way of full enforcement, to those who seek to 
take advantage of others through the imposition of overreaching contracts. 
 and Congress would surely have been 
aware of this doctrine at the time. 
The first rationale—protection of weaker parties—is fairly evident.  
Modern unconscionability is designed to protect contracting parties from 
“oppression and unfair surprise.”54  This solicitude is at its greatest when it 
comes to parties with weak bargaining power:  “gross inequality of 
bargaining power, together with terms unreasonably favorable to the 
stronger party, may confirm indications that the transaction involved 
elements of deception or compulsion, or may show that the weaker party 
had no meaningful choice . . . .”55
Important though this rationale is, unconscionability has also long been a 
doctrine of preserving judicial integrity and ensuring that courts not 
participate in perpetrating injustice.  As one court observed in a leading 
case on unconscionability: 
 
[A] party who has offered and succeeded in getting an agreement as tough 
as [the one before the court] is, should not come to a chancellor and ask 
court help in the enforcement of its terms.  That equity does not enforce 
unconscionable bargains is too well established to require elaborate 
citation.56
The court noted that although the contract before it was not illegal and 
could be enforced, specific enforcement would not be granted because “the 
sum total of [the contract’s] provisions drives too hard a bargain for a court 
of conscience to assist.”
 
57  Similarly, Justice Frankfurter, in a dissent to a 
1942 Supreme Court opinion, described the “basic doctrine that the courts 
will not permit themselves to be used as instruments of inequity and 
injustice” as firmly embedded in the law.58
 
 53. See, e.g., Scott v. United States, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 443, 445 (1870) (noting that “[i]f 
a contract be unreasonable and unconscionable, but not void for fraud, a court of law will 
give to the party who sues for its breach damages, not according to its letter, but only such as 
he is equitably entitled to”).  I have previously argued that unconscionability had become 
well established in the United States by the end of the nineteenth century. See Stephen E. 
Friedman, Giving Unconscionability More Muscle:  Attorney’s Fees as a Remedy for 
Contractual Overreaching, 44 GA. L. REV. 317, 339–40 (2010). 
 
 54. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2002). 
 55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (1981). 
 56. Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1948). 
 57. Id. at 84. 
 58. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 326 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting). 
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While unconscionability largely developed as an equitable doctrine, it 
also has deep roots in law59 and there, too, unconscionability was largely 
about judicial discretion and integrity.  Unconscionability manifested itself 
in law as a doctrine that permitted a court to adjust the extent to which it 
would enforce a contract.  As the Supreme Court noted in 1870, “If a 
contract be unreasonable and unconscionable . . . a court of law will give to 
the party who sues for its breach damages, not according to its letter, but 
only such as he is equitably entitled to.”60  Similarly, in an 1872 opinion, a 
New York state court refused to fully enforce a contract to write an 
autobiography because the award sought struck the court as “so monstrous 
and extravagant that it would be a reproach to the administration of justice 
to countenance or uphold it.”61
Having established a preliminary answer to Justice Breyer’s questions by 
saying that two rationales—the protection of vulnerable parties and the 
protection of the courts—underlie unconscionability, we can turn more 
specifically to the relationship between unconscionability and the FAA 
when it comes to arbitration provisions. 
 
C.  The FAA and Unconscionability:  The Twain Meet 
1.  Initial Encounters 
Since the 1980s we have seen the “expansion of arbitration into the realm 
of standardized consumer and employment contracts.”62  As arbitration 
provisions moved from their traditional role in commercial transactions and 
labor-management transactions into other types of transactions, such as 
consumer transactions,63
Additionally, parties began drafting arbitration agreements in ways that 
struck some courts as overreaching.  Instead of “plain vanilla” arbitration 
provisions that might simply refer all disputes to arbitration under the rules 
of a provider of arbitration services (such as the American Arbitration 
 arbitration provisions began playing more and 
more on unconscionability’s turf. 
 
 59. JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 9.38, at 382 (5th ed. 
2003).  
 60. Scott v. United States, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 443, 445 (1870). 
 61. Greer v. Tweed, 13 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 427, 429 (N.Y. Ct. Com. Pl. 1872). 
 62. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration:  The “New Litigation,” 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 
37; see also Wylie Indep. Sch. Dist. v. TMC Founds., Inc., 770 S.W.2d 19, 23–24 (Tex. 
App. 1989) (Howell, J., dissenting) (noting a continuing trend towards the use of arbitration 
provisions in various types of agreements, including employment agreements, insurance 
agreements, and contracts for the sale of consumers goods, and predicting an acceleration of 
this proliferation). 
 63. See generally Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” To Arbitrate 
Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses:  The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 55–56 (2004) (noting that over the past few decades there has been a 
shift from arbitration provisions being used primarily in commercial transactions and labor-
management transactions to arbitration provisions being used in consumer transactions, as 
well); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the Consumerization of Arbitration, 
92 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 6–8 (1997) (discussing widespread use of arbitration in consumer and 
employment contracts following series of expansive Supreme Court decisions in the 1980s). 
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Association), carefully tailored arbitration provisions began appearing.  
Arbitration provisions were drafted that limited the type or amount of 
damages an arbitrator could award (including limits on the award of 
punitive damages), prohibited class-wide arbitration, required employees or 
consumers to arbitrate their claims but permitted the drafting party to sue in 
court, failed to assure a neutral arbitrator, imposed cost allocations that 
might discourage the bringing of claims, and called for arbitration in a 
forum inconvenient for the consumer or employee.64
Unconscionability was brought to bear on these aspects of arbitration 
provisions as part of a large upswing in the use of unconscionability to 
police arbitration agreements beginning in the 1990s.
 
65  Professor Charles 
Knapp surveyed reported case law on unconscionability from 1990 through 
2008.  He observed a dramatic increase in the number of annual claims of 
unconscionability as a defense to enforcement of an arbitration provision—
“from 1 or 2 at most through 1996, up to an average of 38 from the years 
2003 through 2007, and to 115 in 2008.”66
The results of this increased use of unconscionability are not always 
clear, and arbitration provisions may be treated very differently depending 
on what court is assessing them.  As one article noted in comparing Georgia 
and California law, “[m]any jurisdictions, including Georgia, [are] . . . 
reluctant to invalidate arbitration agreements on unconscionability grounds” 
while in California “a parallel body of unconscionability jurisprudence” has 
resulted in “hundreds of California cases [that] expand and justify the use of 
unconscionability to strike down arbitration provisions.”
 
67  Class action 
waivers in arbitration provisions provide one useful illustration of the mess 
that is current unconscionability doctrine.  Some courts have found 
limitations on a consumer’s right to proceed as part of a class to be 
substantively unconscionable,68 while others have found it to be not 
substantively unconscionable.69
 
 64. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game:  Strategic Judging and 
the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1437–39 (2008) 
(describing various aspects of arbitration provisions that courts have focused on as 
potentially problematic). 
  California courts, for their part, have 
 65. Id. at 1439–41 (quantifying increased use of unconscionability defenses directed 
towards arbitration provisions); see also Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to 
Arbitration:  Federal Preemption, Contract Unconscionability, and Agreements To 
Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 469, 492–500 (collecting cases applying unconscionability 
doctrine to various aspects of arbitration provisions); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, 
Unconscionability, and Equilibrium:  The Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a 
Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 757, 799–812 
(2004) (discussing the increased use of unconscionability to police arbitration agreements). 
 66. Charles L. Knapp, Blowing the Whistle on Mandatory Arbitration:  
Unconscionability as a Signaling Device, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 609, 622 (2009). 
 67. Ryan M. Turley, Only the Rich Can Afford a Remedy:  The Unconscionable 
Enforcement of Arbitration Provisions Against the Indigent, 2007 J. DISP. RESOL. 611, 614–
15. 
 68. See, e.g., Cottonwood Fin., Ltd. v. Estes, 2010 WI App 75, ¶ 1, 325 Wis. 2d 749, 
784 N.W.2d 726. 
 69. See, e.g., La Torre v. BFS Retail & Commercial Operations, LLC, No. 08-22046-
CIV, 2008 WL 5156301, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 8, 2008). 
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developed a three-part test for determining when a waiver by a consumer of 
the right to proceed in a class is unconscionable.70  Arbitration law has thus 
become something of a patchwork—hardly a desirable result in a federal 
statute that articulates a national policy.71
Some commentators have cheered the increasing use of 
unconscionability to assess arbitration provisions,
 
72 while others have 
criticized it as a return to the judicial hostility that the FAA was designed to 
eliminate.73
2.  The Supreme Court on Arbitration and Unconscionability 
  This Article seeks to add to that debate by questioning the very 
premise that courts have the authority to assess the unconscionability of 
arbitration provisions. 
The Supreme Court has sent mixed signals when it comes to arbitration 
provisions and unconscionability.  The Court noted in Allied-Bruce 
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson74 that “[s]tates may regulate contracts, including 
arbitration clauses, under general contract law principles.”75
What States may not do is decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce 
all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its 
arbitration clause.  The [FAA] makes any such state policy unlawful, for 
that kind of policy would place arbitration clauses on an unequal 
“footing,” directly contrary to the [FAA’s] language and Congress’ 
intent.
  But the Court 
went on to note: 
76
The above language, while not directly referring to unconscionability, 
provides guidance in understanding the role that unconscionability can (and 
cannot) play in the policing of arbitration provisions.  Taken literally, the 
language in Allied-Bruce would seem to say that while a contract containing 
an arbitration provision can be deemed unenforceable, the arbitration 
provision itself cannot be a factor in making that determination. 
 
The relationship between unconscionability and arbitration was 
mentioned, though in dicta, in Perry v. Thomas.77
 
 70. See Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005). 
  In that case the Court 
declined to consider a claim that an arbitration provision was 
unconscionable but noted that the lower court was free to consider the 
matter on remand.  The Court gave some guidance to the lower court: 
 71. See, e.g., Fit Tech Inc. v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp., 374 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 
2004) (noting it is obvious that a uniform federal definition of the word “arbitration” is 
required). 
 72. See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 65, at 808 (arguing that the “advent of renewed 
unconscionability-based scrutiny of arbitration clauses is on the whole a positive trend”). 
 73. See infra notes 128–36 and accompanying text. 
 74. 513 U.S. 265 (1995). 
 75. Id. at 281. 
 76. Id. 
 77. 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987) (citing Southland Corp v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 n.11 
(1984); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967)). 
2011] LITTLE DARLINGS AND LITTLE MONSTERS 2047 
[Under section 2], state law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, is 
applicable if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, 
revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally.  A state-law 
principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to 
arbitrate is at issue does not comport with this requirement of [section] 2.  
A court may not, then, in assessing the rights of litigants to enforce an 
arbitration agreement, construe that agreement in a manner different from 
that in which it otherwise construes nonarbitration agreements under state 
law.  Nor may a court rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate 
as a basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would be 
unconscionable, for this would enable the court to effect what we hold 
today the state legislature cannot.78
Perry left for the lower court the determination of whether 
unconscionability as directed against an arbitration provision is a law that 
governs contracts generally.  Further, while the Court indicated that the 
“uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate” cannot be the basis of a 
determination of unconscionability, it left open what is included within the 
scope of that uniqueness.  At the very least, Perry would seem to put some 
aspects of arbitration beyond the range of unconscionability. 
 
The Court discussed, albeit briefly and in dicta, the relationship between 
unconscionability and the FAA in Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto.79  
The Court in Casarotto held that a Montana statute that required arbitration 
provisions to be in underlined capital letters on the first page of a contract 
was preempted by the FAA because the Montana statute impermissibly 
singled out arbitration provisions for suspect status.80  Although a Montana 
statute (and not unconscionability) was at issue in Casarotto, the Court 
indicated in dicta that unconscionability is applicable to arbitration 
provisions covered by the FAA.  The Court gave three examples of 
generally applicable contract defenses—“fraud, duress, or 
unconscionability”—each of which the Court said “may be applied to 
invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening [section] 2.”81
The recent opinion of Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson
 
82 provides the 
Court’s most significant discussion of the relationship between 
unconscionability and the FAA.  The key issue before the Court in Jackson 
was whether the court or the arbitrators should decide the unconscionability 
of an arbitration provision.  The arbitration agreement at issue in Jackson 
provided in relevant part that the “Arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or 
local court or agency, shall have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute 
relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability or formation of 
this Agreement including, but not limited to any claim that all or any part of 
this Agreement is void or voidable.”83
 
 78. Id. 
 
 79. 517 U.S. 681 (1996). 
 80. Id. at 683, 686–87. 
 81. Id. at 687. 
 82. 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010). 
 83. Id. at 2775. 
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An earlier opinion had established two key guiding principles (though 
not with respect to unconscionability in particular) that the Jackson Court 
applied.  In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.,84 
the Court had held that a claim for fraud in the inducement of an entire 
contract (as opposed to a claim directed against the arbitration provision in 
particular) was generally for the arbitrator, not the court, to decide.85  In 
reaching that decision the Court held that, as a matter of federal substantive 
law, an arbitration provision is separable from the contract in which it is 
embedded.86  Further, the Court in Prima Paint held that a challenge to the 
contract as a whole is to be addressed by the arbitrator.  Only if a challenge 
is to the arbitration provision itself is the court to consider the matter.87  
The reason for the rule of severability, the Court explained in Jackson, is 
that section 2 makes written provisions “valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable” without any mention that the contract in which it is included 
must also be valid.88
The Court in Jackson made clear that the fact that an arbitration provision 
is severable does not make it “unassailable”
 
89 and that one of the bases on 
which an arbitration provision could be assailed is unconscionability.  The 
Court noted, as it had in Casarotto, that “[l]ike other contracts . . . 
[arbitration provisions] may be invalidated by ‘generally applicable contract 
defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.’”90  The Court noted 
as well that the “validity of a written agreement to arbitrate ( . . . including, 
of course whether it was void for unconscionability) is governed by 
[section] 2’s provision that it shall be valid ‘save upon such grounds as exist 
at law or equity for the revocation of any contract.’”91
The Court in Jackson held that the challenge at issue was to the validity 
of the contract as a whole (even though the “whole” contract was an 
arbitration agreement without any other provisions) and thus was properly 
directed to the arbitrator and not the court.  Only a challenge to the specific 
aspect of the arbitration agreement at issue—the granting of authority to the 
arbitrator to decide questions of validity—would have been for the court.
 
92
The Court thus pushed the concept of severability quite hard.  The dissent 
observed that the severability rule established by Prima Paint permits a 





 84. 388 U.S. 395 (1967). 
  The dissent then criticized the majority for 
extending that rule to an extreme:  “Today the Court adds a new layer of 
severability—something akin to Russian nesting dolls—into the mix:  
Courts may now pluck from a potentially invalid arbitration agreement 
 85. Id. at 404. 
 86. Id. at 402–04. 
 87. Id. at 403–04. 
 88. 130 S. Ct. at 2776 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)). 
 89. Id. at 2778. 
 90. Id. at 2776 (quoting Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)). 
 91. Id. at 2777 n.1 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2). 
 92. Id. at 2778. 
 93. Id. at 2786 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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even narrower provisions that refer particular arbitrability disputes to an 
arbitrator.”94
Because the Court held that the challenge was to the agreement as a 
whole and hence for the arbitrator, the Court did not fully resolve the 
question of how an unconscionability analysis would fit into the judicial 
procedures of the statute.  The Court seemed to assume that such a 
challenge would be decided under the procedures for a stay of litigation and 
an order to compel arbitration set forth in sections 3 and 4, respectively.  
The Court noted, for instance, that sections 3 and 4 are designed to 
implement section 2’s substantive rule.
 
95  In somewhat ambiguous 
language, the Court stated that if a party challenges the validity of an 
arbitration agreement under section 2, “the federal court must consider the 
challenge before ordering compliance with that agreement under [section] 
4.”96
The Court did characterize unconscionability as a “gateway” issue, and 
this characterization gives some indication of how unconscionability is to 
be treated.  Gateway issues, “such as whether the parties have agreed to 
arbitrate or whether their agreement covers a particular controversy,”
  It is difficult to know whether this dicta indicates that the 
consideration of the challenge is carried out under the rubric of section 4 or 
whether the consideration is somehow separate from section 4 (i.e., must 
come “before” the analysis under section 4 in some procedure not explicitly 
set out in the FAA). 
97 are 
the types of issues that parties would likely have expected a court to decide.  
By placing unconscionability alongside issues of contract formation, which 
are to be determined under section 4, the Court indicated that 
unconscionability should be decided by a like procedure.98
It was with this last point that the Court, in my view, went somewhat 
astray.  The bottom line result of Jackson will be the removal from the 
courts of many determinations of the unconscionability of arbitration 
provisions.  Assuming a sufficiently broad grant of arbitral authority in the 
agreement it appears that, as a practical matter, the only issue of 
unconscionability that a court will address is a challenge to the very grant of 
authority to the arbitrator.  It seems unlikely that such a grant will be 
deemed unconscionable with any frequency.  This result is perfectly 
consistent with the FAA and perfectly consistent with this Article’s key 
argument—courts should largely be put out of the unconscionability 
business when it comes to arbitration provisions. 
 
However, the Court in Jackson should, in my view, have taken the next 
logical step.  Instead of leaving a fairly small scrap of unconscionability 
determinations to the courts, it should have simply removed the 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 2776. 
 96. Id. at 2778. 
 97. Id. at 2777. 
 98. Cf. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403–04 (1967) 
(noting that fraud in the inducement directed at the arbitration provision at issue would be 
determined under section 4). 
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unconscionability doctrine completely from the judicial realm when it 
comes to arbitration provisions.  In the next part of the Article, I discuss 
why such a result is called for by the FAA. 
II.  UNCONSCIONABILITY IS NOT AN APPROPRIATE TOOL FOR JUDICIAL 
POLICING OF ARBITRATION PROVISIONS 
This part of the Article puts forward several reasons why courts should 
not use unconscionability to police arbitration provisions.  First, the whole 
point of the FAA is to take arbitration provisions out of the doghouse by 
removing judicial discretion when it comes to their enforcement.  While the 
FAA was not intended to insulate arbitration provisions from all challenges, 
it was intended to insulate them from the type of judicial discretion inherent 
in unconscionability.  This intent is made clear through the legislative 
history as well as commentary contemporaneous with the passage of the 
FAA.  Second, that intent is made clear through the structure of the FAA, 
which leaves neither a procedure nor an opportunity for judicial discretion 
(except to a very limited degree after the arbitrators reach their decision).  
Third, unconscionability is, in highly relevant ways, different from duress 
and fraud.  While duress and fraud are certainly permissible defenses to the 
enforcement of an arbitration provision and likely should be addressed 
under section 4, unconscionability is significantly different and should be 
treated differently for purposes of the FAA. 
A.  Limiting Judicial Discretion 
The two main rationales for unconscionability are, as discussed above, 
the protection of weaker parties and the preservation of judicial integrity 
(effectuated by giving courts the discretion to refuse full enforcement of 
overreaching contract terms).99
The rule of revocability which the FAA eliminated was itself a judicial 
tool for the protection of vulnerable parties.  In his testimony to the joint 
congressional committee considering the legislation, Julius Henry Cohen, 
general counsel for the New York State Chamber of Commerce
  The FAA has addressed both these issues 
on the legislative level and removed them from the judicial realm when it 
comes to arbitration provisions.  The drafters of the FAA understood that 
they were making a trade-off:  simplicity and rigorous enforcement of 
arbitration provisions took the place of judicial protection and discretion. 
100 and one 
of the primary drafters of both the New York Arbitration Law and the 
FAA,101
 
 99. See supra notes 
 noted that “the real fundamental cause [for the rule of revocability] 
was that at the time this rule was made people were not able to take care of 
themselves in making contracts, and the stronger men would take advantage 
54–61 and accompanying text. 
 100. Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes:  Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 
646 Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 13 (1924) 
[hereinafter Joint Hearings] (statement of Julius Henry Cohen).  
 101. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1406 n.7 (2008) 
(describing Cohen and looking to his testimony before Congress to understand meaning of 
the FAA); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 274, 279 (1995) (same). 
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of the weaker, and the courts had to come in and protect them.”102  Cohen 
further noted that courts applying the rule of revocability “said, ‘If you let 
the people sign away their rights, the powerful people will come in and take 
away the rights of the weaker ones.’”103  He continued, “And that still is 
true to a certain extent.”104
Thus, Cohen and Congress understood that there was contractual 
overreaching directed against weaker parties and that courts were concerned 
about this overreaching.  Yet Congress still passed the FAA, presumably 
determining that simplicity and the desirability of enforcing arbitration 
provisions outweighed these judicial concerns.  The main purpose of the 
FAA was to take away from courts the judicial tool of the rule of 
revocability (and presumably other similar tools) that protected vulnerable 
parties.  Perhaps Congress believed such tools were not necessary or that 
other values outweighed judicial skittishness.  Perhaps Congress was 
wrong, but that is a different matter. 
 
Congress apparently saw fit to rely on non-judicial sources to protect 
weaker parties.  The passage of the FAA, as well as similar statutes, 
assumes a great deal of faith in the ability of the arbitrators themselves to 
provide justice.  The rule of revocability was premised in part on a belief on 
the part of nineteenth century courts that arbitration provided “second-rate 
justice at best.”105  But the FAA was designed to reverse that judicial 
hostility and ensure that arbitrators be given the power to adjudicate 
disputes.106  The FAA is designed to permit the arbitration to proceed 
“without interference by the court”107 and the FAA facilitates a “full and 
fair consideration of the controversy” by the arbitrators.108  The limited 
bases available for a court to vacate, modify, or correct an arbitrator’s 
award109
The legislative history indicates that the FAA is premised on the belief 
that to the extent arbitrators were not fully up to the task of doing justice or 
protecting parties, legislation would provide sufficient additional protection.  
Senator Thomas Sterling, who was chairing the joint hearings, pressed 
Cohen on the issue of contractual overreaching.  Senator Sterling noted, 
“There are certain contracts to-day between the railroads and the shippers in 
which there is an agreement to arbitrate, and the representation is made to 
 also demonstrate a faith in the ability of the arbitrators to do 
justice. 
 
 102. Joint Hearings, supra note 100, at 15 (statement of Julius Henry Cohen). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See Wold Architects & Eng’rs v. Strat, 713 N.W.2d 750, 761–62 (Mich. 2006) 
(Corrigan, J., concurring) (discussing judicial hostility to arbitration in the nineteenth 
century). 
 106. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
 107. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 2 (1924). 
 108. Joint Hearings, supra note 100, at 36 (containing the brief on the proposed federal 
arbitration statute). 
 109. See infra notes 175–87 and accompanying text.  
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the shipper, ‘You can take it or leave it, just as you please; but unless you 
sign you can not ship.’”110
While Senator Sterling was focused on transactions between commercial 
entities, Cohen’s answer also addressed the imposition of arbitration 
provisions on individuals: 
 
 There is nothing to that contention, Mr. Chairman, for this reason:  In 
the first place, we have the bills of lading act, and the bills of lading act 
contains the terms of the bill of lading.  And that is a protection to the 
shipper. 
 And then we have the regulation of the Federal Government, through 
its regularly constituted bodies, and they protect everybody.  Railroad 
contracts and express contracts and insurance contracts are provided for.  
You can not get a provision into an insurance contract to-day unless it is 
approved by the insurance department.  In other words, people are 
protected to-day as never before.111
Cohen thus had in mind that arbitration agreements would be imposed on 
“regular” people, not just commercial entities.  Nowhere in his answer does 
Cohen indicate any role for courts in policing against overreaching 
contracts, and Senator Sterling’s question seems to assume that any such 
judicial protection is being removed by the FAA. 
 
In addition to the arbitrators and the legislatures, the only other source 
that Cohen mentions for the protection against improper use of arbitration 
agreements is the good judgment of lawyers.  In a law review article, he and 
his co-author noted that “what is designed for use is subject to abuse” and 
that “the arbitration clause requires skill and intelligent understanding of its 
place in the scheme of contracts and of its limitations and of the safeguards 
against its misuse.”112
As the Supreme Court has noted, the “preeminent concern of Congress in 
passing the [FAA] was to enforce private agreements into which parties had 
entered, and that concern requires that we rigorously enforce agreements to 
arbitrate.”
  But nowhere is there a hint that the courts would 
provide any protection. 
113
Early commentators on arbitration legislation recognized and assumed 
that the FAA and similar state arbitration statutes stripped courts of their 
discretion and these commentators often criticized this aspect of the 
  Thus, rigorous enforcement and simplicity were given a 
higher value than protection of weaker parties by the courts.  The FAA 
represents a legislative determination that courts should, regardless of what 
their “consciences” tell them, enforce arbitration provisions.  Arbitration 
provisions are, in essence, “pre-approved” and do not have to pass the usual 
judicial tests for specific enforcement (including, presumably, that the 
arbitration agreement being enforced is not unconscionable). 
 
 110. Joint Hearings, supra note 100, at 15 (statement of Julius Henry Cohen).  
 111. Id. 
 112. Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. 
L. REV. 265, 281 (1926). 
 113. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985). 
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legislation.  A 1933 law review article by Professor Philip Phillips114 
focused on the adoption of state statutes based on the American Arbitration 
Association’s Model Arbitration Act (MAA),115 a draft act “in complete 
accord” with the FAA and designed to do for arbitration provisions in 
intrastate transactions what the FAA did for arbitration provisions in 
interstate transactions.116  The MAA is, in relevant respects, virtually 
identical to the FAA.117  Phillips observed that “one concrete result” of the 
adoption of statutes based on the MAA “has been the frequent insertion of 
arbitration clauses in ‘take or leave it’ contracts containing provisions no 
court would enforce but which arbitrators invariably do.”118
Standardized order blanks used in business dealings with small buyers or 
housewives frequently contain arbitration clauses, and the unsuspecting 
small buyer or housewife signs the contract and is taken advantage of as a 
result.  The courts generally hold that the making of the contract is not in 
issue and order arbitration to proceed . . . .
  Phillips 
plainly had in mind take it or leave it contracts imposed on individuals: 
119
Philips criticized the arbitration laws for their stripping away of judicial 
discretion in the enforcement of arbitration provisions.  He observed that 
the language of the MAA “leaves no ground for misunderstanding.  The 
court is given no discretion to deny a motion to compel arbitration, and if 
the trial judge is satisfied that ‘the making of the contract . . . or the failure 
to comply therewith is not in issue,’ arbitration is ordered to proceed.”
 
120  
Phillips was highly critical of this stripping away of discretion:  “Is equity 
history to be taken so lightly and equitable principles to be so disregarded 
that specific performance, always a remedy in the discretion of the 
chancellor, is now to be granted wholesale, without thought?”121  
Unconscionability, it bears repeating, is itself a doctrine that had previously 
been used to withhold specific performance from otherwise enforceable 
agreements.122
Similarly, Professor Sidney Simpson, in a law review article published in 
1934, compared American arbitration statutes (the FAA and comparable 
state statutes) with the English Arbitration Act.
  It, too, is presumably taken off the table by the FAA, along 
with other similar doctrines. 
123
 
 114. Philip G. Phillips, The Paradox in Arbitration Law:  Compulsion as Applied to a 
Voluntary Proceeding, 46 HARV. L. REV. 1258 (1933). 
  Simpson noted that 
“[m]odern American arbitration statutes have been regarded as imposing 
 115. The Model Arbitration Act (MAA) is reprinted in Model Arbitration Statute Offered, 
10 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y. 122, 124–26 (1926–1927). 
 116. Id. at 126 (containing the MAA Summary). 
 117. A comparison of 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, and 11, with, respectively, MAA §§ 1, 2, 
3, 9, 10, and 11, shows that the text of the two acts is nearly identical. 
 118. Phillips, supra note 114, at 1274. 
 119. Id. at 1274–75. 
 120. Id. at 1265. 
 121. Id. at 1266. 
 122. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 123. Sidney P. Simpson, Specific Enforcement of Arbitration Contracts, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 
160 (1934). 
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upon the courts a mandatory ‘duty to enforce’ arbitration agreements.”124  
In contrast, the English Arbitration Act existing at the time gave “the court 
discretion as to whether or not to stay an action brought in violation of an 
arbitration clause.”125  Simpson strongly favored the English approach in 
his article, noting that the American system of compelling arbitration in 
every instance even when it is “unjust in the particular case” may bring the 
whole system of arbitration into “disrepute.”126  Simpson noted that “there 
can be no doubt that such cases of injustice can and do arise” as in the 
inclusion in contracts of adhesion of “onerous arbitration clauses.”127
While early commentators assumed that the FAA was meant to remove 
judicial discretion and make arbitration provisions automatically 
enforceable, modern commentators have demonstrated that Congress was 
right to be suspicious of courts wielding discretionary and equitable tools 
when it comes to arbitration provisions.  Various analyses in the past 
decade of efforts by courts to apply unconscionability to arbitration 
provisions suggest that a fear that judicial discretion will result in judicial 
hostility is well founded.  For instance, Professor Steven Burton has 
observed that in many instances unconscionability is being used as part of a 
new judicial hostility towards arbitration strongly reminiscent of the state of 
affairs that the FAA was designed to correct.
  The 
American arbitration statutes, such as the FAA, were, according to 
Simpson, simply not equipped to deal with such injustices since they had 
effectively given pre-approval to arbitration provisions. 
128  Thus, Professor Burton’s 
analysis of unconscionability cases led him to conclude that:  “There is a 
new judicial hostility to arbitration in noncommercial cases.  Many courts, 
when asked to enforce an arbitration agreement, seize upon the 
unconscionability doctrine as a pretext to refuse enforcement.”129
Similarly, Professor Susan Randall compared the way in which courts 
apply unconscionability to similar issues in the arbitration context and in 
the non-arbitration context.
 
130  For example, she found that while courts 
generally enforce forum-selection clauses in cases that do not involve 
arbitration agreements, courts routinely find forum-selection clauses in 
arbitration agreements unconscionable.131  More broadly, Professor 
Randall’s study of unconscionability cases for the period of 2002 through 
2003 shows that courts were almost twice as likely to find arbitration 
provisions unconscionable compared to other types of contracts.132
 
 124. Id. at 173–74 (quoting Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 130 N.E. 288, 291 
(N.Y. 1921)). 
 
 125. Id. at 174. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Burton, supra note 65, at 469–71. 
 129. Id. at 500. 
 130. Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of 
Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185 (2004). 
 131. Id. at 214–18. 
 132. Id. at 194–96. 
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Stephen A. Broome concluded that judicial hostility towards arbitration 
agreements is evident in California.133  His survey of cases from the 
California intermediate courts of appeals showed that unconscionability 
challenges are more than five times more likely to succeed when directed 
against an arbitration provision as compared to other types of contract 
provisions.134  Further, California courts have imposed, under the guise of 
unconscionability, requirements on arbitration provisions that are not 
imposed on other types of contracts.  For instance, under California law an 
arbitration provision that is not binding on both parties is likely to be found 
unconscionable.135  Because “[o]utside of the arbitration context, California 
law does not require mutuality of obligation,”136
In sum, Congress intended to remove discretionary tools from the 
courts
 the requirement of 
mutuality in the arbitration context represents and reflects a judicial 
hostility towards arbitration. 
137
B.  The Structure of the FAA 
 (presumably leaving the fairness of arbitration provisions to 
arbitrators) and, insofar as courts have wielded their discretion against 
arbitration, was right to do so.  This intent is also demonstrated by the 
structure of the FAA, a point I turn to now. 
Not only the FAA’s legislative history and contemporaneous 
commentary, but also its structure, supports the proposition that the FAA 
leaves no place for the type of judicial discretion that is the lifeblood of 
unconscionability.  Sections 3 and 4 implement the substantive rule of 
section 2.138  Through these sections the FAA provides “two parallel 
devices for enforcing an arbitration agreement:  a stay of litigation in any 
case raising a dispute referable to arbitration [provided for in section 3] and 
an affirmative order to engage in arbitration [provided for in section 4].”139  
The Court has indicated that section 3 is binding on state courts as well as 
federal courts.140  Whether state courts or only federal courts are bound by 
section 4 is, according to the Court, “less clear.”141
 
 133. Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the Unconscionability 
Doctrine:  How the California Courts Are Circumventing the Federal Arbitration Act, 3 
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 39, 65 (2006). 
  Regardless of whether 
state courts are technically bound by both sections 3 and 4, the structure of 
the FAA demonstrates what Congress had in mind for the role of the courts 
in enforcing arbitration agreements. 
 134. Id. at 44–48. 
 135. See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 691–93 (Cal. 
2000) (requiring a “modicum of bilaterality” in arbitration agreements, and asserting that 
such a requirement does not run afoul of the FAA). 
 136. Broome, supra note 133, at 52. 
 137. Except for a very limited discretion in deciding whether to confirm an arbitration 
judgment. See infra notes 175–87 and accompanying text.  
 138. See Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010). 
 139. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 22 (1983). 
 140. See id. at 26 n.34. 
 141. Id. at 26.  The Court noted that, unlike section 3, section 4 refers to a petition being 
made in a United States district court. Id. at 26 n.35. 
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As noted earlier, section 3 requires a court to stay litigation of “any issue 
referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such 
arbitration.”142  Section 3 contemplates a judicial determination of whether 
a disputed issue is within the scope of an arbitration agreement—the court 
must be “satisfied” that it is before staying litigation.143  Additionally, a 
court must also be satisfied that an arbitration agreement was actually made, 
as provided for in section 4.144  But section 3 contains nothing that even 
hints at judicial discretion.  If the court finds the issue referable under an 
arbitration agreement it “shall . . . stay the trial of the action until such 
arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement.”145
Several courts have noted that section 3 permits no judicial discretion.  
For instance, in Gutierrez v. Academy Corp.,
 
146 the court addressed a claim 
that an arbitration provision was unconscionable.  The court noted that 
section 3 “is mandatory; if the issues in a case are within the reach of the 
agreement, the district court has no discretion to deny the stay.”147  In 
Seguros Banvenez, S.A. v. S/S Oliver Drescher,148 the court rejected the 
lower court’s relatively expansive view of the discretion granted to a court 
under section 3, holding that “‘in passing upon a [section] 3 application for 
a stay while the parties arbitrate, a federal court may consider only issues 
relating to the making and performance of the agreement to arbitrate.’”149
Similarly, section 4 provides no place for judicial discretion.  While 
section 3 provides for a stay of litigation, section 4 authorizes (actually, it 
requires) a court to order the parties to proceed with arbitration on the exact 
terms agreed upon.  Thus, under section 4 (upon a proper petition), the 
court “shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the 
agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, 
the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration 




 142. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2006). 
  Section 4 directs a 
court how to proceed if the “making of the arbitration agreement or the 
failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same” is at issue.  Unless jury trial 
on these issues is waived, the court is to hold a summary jury trial on those 
issues and “[i]f the jury find that an agreement for arbitration was made in 
writing and that there is a default in proceeding thereunder, the court shall 
 143. Id. 
 144. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967) 
(holding that “in passing upon a s[ection] 3 application for a stay while the parties arbitrate, 
a federal court may consider only issues relating to the making and performance of the 
agreement to arbitrate,” thus indicating that the section 4 analysis is relevant to a stay 
brought under section 3). 
 145. 9 U.S.C. § 3. 
 146. 967 F. Supp. 945 (S.D. Tex. 1997). 
 147. Id. at 947. 
 148. 761 F.2d 855 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 149. Id. at 862 (quoting Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 404); see also Schulman Inv. Co. v. 
Olin Corp., 458 F. Supp. 186, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that section 3 forecloses the 
exercise of judicial discretion to consider “judicial economy and avoiding confusion and 
inconsistent results” in deciding whether to grant a stay). 
 150. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (emphasis added). 
2011] LITTLE DARLINGS AND LITTLE MONSTERS 2057 
make an order summarily directing the parties to proceed with the 
arbitration in accordance with the terms thereof.”151  Thus, the court not 
merely may, but “shall” (and the Supreme Court has added the even more 
emphatic “must”152
The requirement for an order to proceed with arbitration “in accordance 
with the terms thereof” is telling.  Unconscionability is notable in that it is a 
flexible doctrine that permits a court a wide latitude in selectively enforcing 
or modifying a contract.
) make an order and the order must be for the parties to 
proceed with the arbitration in accordance with the terms of the arbitration 
provision. 
153  That the statute requires enforcement only in 
accordance with the terms of the agreement, without any possibility for 
modification, indicates that unconscionability has no place in the statutory 
scheme.154  In fact, section 5 of the FAA also reflects that the terms of the 
arbitration agreement are to be followed precisely and without judicial 
interference:  “If in the agreement provision be made for a method of 
naming or appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire, such method 
shall be followed.”155
One might respond at this point that section 4 is the exact right place for 
a determination of unconscionability.  Section 4 requires that the court be 
satisfied that the “making” of the arbitration agreement is not at issue; 
perhaps unconscionability puts the making of the arbitration agreement at 
issue and should simply be addressed under section 4.  Although the Court 
in Jackson did not directly reach the issue (because the unconscionability of 
the arbitration agreement was deemed a question for the arbitrator and not 
the court), dicta in that opinion seem to indicate that a court would assess 
unconscionability under sections 3 and 4.
 
156
There appears to be little case law that unequivocally addresses the 
question.  A federal district court in California recently held that an 
unconscionability challenge “assumes the existence and making of the 
arbitration agreement” and thus does not put the making of the arbitration 




 151. Id. (emphasis added). 
  In contrast, a federal 
district court in Kentucky recently held that the making of the arbitration 
agreement had been put at issue for purposes of section 4 by allegations of 
 152. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 22 n.27 
(1983). 
 153. See U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2002) (providing that a “court may refuse to enforce the 
contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, 
or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any 
unconscionable result”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981) (similar). 
 154. Cf. Phillips, supra note 114, at 1268 (“Generally, at least, equity can enforce its 
remedies as it sees fit.  But not here [i.e., under the arbitration statutes], for in ordering 
arbitration it is directed to do so, ‘in accordance with the terms of the contract.’”). 
 155. 9 U.S.C. § 5. 
 156. See discussion supra Part I.C.2. 
 157. Madrigal v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., No. 09-CV-00033-OWW-SMS, 
2009 WL 2513478, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2009). 
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unconscionability and fraudulent inducement, but it is not clear if the 
unconscionability claim alone would have done so.158
Professor David Horton has argued that unconscionability challenges 
should be addressed under section 4.
 
159  His position is that “the making of 
the agreement to arbitrate” should be read relatively broadly and that in 
order “to contest ‘the making of the agreement to arbitrate’—and thus fall 
within section 4’s ambit—a party need only invoke a contract defense,” 
including a claim that the arbitration provision is unconscionable.160  For 
Professor Horton, it only makes sense to view section 4 as providing a 
judicial forum for claims that might be made under section 2 (i.e., 
challenges based on state laws that are not preempted by the FAA)—
“[o]therwise, Congress went out of its way to create a judicial forum for the 
exceedingly rare assertion that no arbitration clause exists and yet neglected 
to specify where the parties must bring the vast majority of challenges to 
the validity of an arbitration clause.”161
Despite Professor Horton’s excellent analysis, there are many reasons to 
think that an unconscionability challenge directed against an arbitration 
provision does not put the “making” of the arbitration agreement at issue 
for purposes of section 4.  First, the fact that Congress did not specify a 
judicial forum for assessing unconscionability has a simple explanation:  
Congress intended for arbitrators, not courts, to make such assessments. 
 
Second, the legislative history indicates that section 4 is designed for a 
comparatively narrow range of issues.  Section 4 is described in the House 
Report as providing a “method for the summary trial of any claim that no 
arbitration agreement ever was made.”162  An exchange between Julius 
Henry Cohen and Senator Sterling sheds some additional light on section 4.  
Cohen observed that the legislation addresses concerns over the 
constitutional right to trial by jury through the procedure established in 
section 4.163
But you can waive [the right to trial by jury].  And you can do that in 
advance.  Ah, but the question whether you waive it or not depends on 
whether that is your signature to the paper, or whether you authorized that 
signature, or whether the paper is a valid paper or not, whether it was 
delivered properly.  So there is a question there which you have not 
waived the right of trial by jury on.
  Cohen then testified: 
164
Senator Sterling followed up by stating, “The issue there is whether there is 
an agreement to arbitrate or not.”
 
165  Cohen responded, “Exactly.”166
 
 158. Baquie v. E. Energy Corp., No. 1:09-CV-00121-TBR, 2010 WL 1416557, at *6 
(W.D. Ky. Apr. 2, 2010). 
 
 159. David Horton, The Mandatory Core of Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 96 
VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 1, 3 (2010), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2010/
04/02/horton.pdf. 
 160. Id. at 8. 
 161. Id. at 7. 
 162. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 2 (1924). 
 163. Joint Hearings, supra note 100, at 17 (statement of Julius Henry Cohen). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
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A number of things are clear from this exchange.  First, section 4 is about 
a fairly narrow range of issues—whether an arbitration agreement really 
was signed, for example.  Professor Horton, however, takes a contrary 
view.  He points to the reference to “valid paper” as indicating that section 
4 empowers courts to decide a wide range of issues beyond whether there is 
an arbitration agreement.167  It is not entirely clear what Cohen meant by 
“valid paper.”  One law dictionary roughly contemporaneous with the 
passage of the FAA defined “valid” as being “[o]f binding force.  A deed, 
will, or other instrument, which has received all the formalities required by 
law, is said to be valid.”168  This definition seems to point to a very narrow 
meaning of the term “valid paper.”  Another dictionary defined “valid” 
more broadly as “[h]aving force, of binding force; legally sufficient or 
efficacious; authorized by law.”169  And a West Virginia court in 1914 also 
gave a fairly broad meaning to the term “valid paper,” describing it as “such 
as the law permits the parties to make and allows the courts to enforce.”170
Given the doubt about what is meant by “valid paper,” one can only fall 
back on the context, and that context supports a narrow reading.  The 
reference to valid paper is squeezed between a statement that courts should 
decide whether an agreement was signed and another statement that a court 
should decide whether an agreement was properly delivered.  It seems 
unlikely that between these two statements, each dealing with the formal 
requisites of a contract, would be a statement that courts should engage in a 
broad ranging analysis of the contract.  Further, Senator Sterling’s 
description of the issue dealt with by section 4 as being “whether there is an 
agreement to arbitrate or not” and Cohen’s affirmative response also lead to 
a conclusion that the fact of agreement, and not the enforceability of the 
agreement, is the focus of section 4. 
 
In addition to the legislative history and language of the statute, there is 
an additional reason why unconscionability is not to be assessed under 
section 4:  section 4 is directed largely at safeguarding the right to trial by 
jury.171  Section 4 provides that where the issue of the “making of the 
arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform” is “in 
issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof” and that trial is 
to be a jury trial unless “no jury trial be demanded.”172
Thus, section 4 is directed at issues that are for a jury to decide; however, 
unconscionability is not such an issue.  Unconscionability is “addressed to 
the court, and the decision is to be made by it” and evidence regarding 
 
 
 166. Id. 
 167. Horton, supra note 159, at 7. 
 168. HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, A LAW DICTIONARY CONTAINING DEFINITIONS OF THE 
TERMS AND PHRASES OF AMERICAN AND ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE, ANCIENT AND MODERN 
1196 (2d ed. 1910). 
 169. 2 JOHN BOUVIER, BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY AND CONCISE ENCYLOPEDIA 3387 
(Francis Rawle ed., 8th ed. 1914). 
 170. Raleigh Cnty. Bank v. Poteet, 82 S.E. 332, 336 (W. Va. 1914). 
 171. See S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 8 (1924) (noting that the right to a jury trial is adequately 
safeguarded by section 4). 
 172. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006). 
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commercial practices is “for the court’s consideration, not the jury’s.”173  
Section 4 may be broad enough to include claims of fraud and duress, since 
these are traditionally jury issues,174
Unconscionability does not really go to the issue of whether a contract 
was made.  As noted earlier, in many jurisdictions the circumstances 
surrounding the making of the contract are not even relevant.  Further, the 
key rationales of unconscionability are the protection of vulnerable parties 
and the protection of judicial integrity.  While these are both important 
values, neither has to do with the “making” of the contract—the contract 
has been made and we need to decide what to do with it. 
 but section 4 leaves no place for 
unconscionability or other exercises of judicial discretion. 
The FAA’s structure does not completely remove all opportunity for 
judicial supervision or discretion when it comes to the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements.  It simply postpones and cabins it by providing for 
very limited judicial review after the arbitration award is entered.  Section 9 
of the FAA provides that after an arbitration is complete, a party to the 
arbitration may apply to the appropriate court for an order confirming the 
award and that the court “must” grant such an order unless there are 
grounds for vacating, modifying, or correcting the award under sections 10 
or 11 of the FAA.175  Those grounds are quite narrow and provide some, 
although very limited, space for an exercise of judicial discretion.  As Julius 
Henry Cohen observed in a brief he submitted in support of the passage of 
the FAA:  “The courts are bound to accept and enforce the award of the 
arbitrators unless there is in it a defect so inherently vicious that, as a matter 
of common morality, it ought not to be enforced.”176  He continued, noting 
that the FAA provides “no authority and no opportunity for the court, in 
connection with the award, to inject its own ideas of what the award should 
have been.”177
Section 10 provides that an arbitration award can be vacated in the 
following circumstances: 
  Congress knew how to grant courts some limited authority.  
It simply granted that limited authority through sections 10 and 11 and 
determined that this authority is to be exercised after the arbitrators enter 
their award. 
 (1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue 
means; 
 (2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, 
or either of them; 
 (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to 
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear 
 
 173. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 3 (2002); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 208 cmt. f (1981) (noting that “determination that a contract or term is unconscionable is 
made by the court”). 
 174. See infra notes 189–90 and accompanying text. 
 175. 9 U.S.C. § 9. 
 176. Joint Hearings, supra note 100, at 36. 
 177. Id. 
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evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other 
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or 
 (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly 
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject 
matter submitted was not made.178
The broad discretion of unconscionability is thus replaced with a much 
narrower opportunity for judicial discretion. 
 
Grounds for modification of an award are “equally limited.”179  Section 
11 permits a modification in three situations only.  Two of these grounds 
involve cases of ministerial mistakes, as with an evident material mistake 
(either in the calculation of figures or in the “description of any person, 
thing, or property referred to in the award”180) or cases where the “award is 
imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy.”181  
The remaining ground permits a modification in cases in which the 
arbitrators “awarded upon a matter not submitted to them.”182  The broad 
“justice” afforded by unconscionability is thus replaced with a much 
narrower, post-arbitration opportunity for a court to modify an arbitrator’s 
award “so as to effect the intent thereof and promote justice between the 
parties.”183
The Supreme Court has made clear that sections 10 and 11 represent the 
sum total of judicial discretion and cannot be expanded, even by agreement 
of the parties.  For instance, in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, 
Inc.,
 
184 the Court addressed an arbitration agreement that called for the 
court to vacate, modify, or correct an arbitration award where either the 
findings of fact were not supported by substantial evidence or the 
conclusions of law were erroneous.185  The Court held that permitting 
parties to expand the “detailed categories would rub too much against the 
grain of the [section] 9 language, where provision for judicial confirmation 
carries no hint of flexibility.”186
In sum, the structure and wording of the FAA make clear that judicial 
application of the unconscionability doctrine has no place in the FAA and 
that judicial discretion is limited to the narrow post-award review provided 
for by sections 10 and 11.  It is that narrow review that provides, albeit it in 
 
 
 178. 9 U.S.C. § 10. 
 179. Cohen & Dayton, supra note 112, at 273. 
 180. 9 U.S.C. § 11(a). 
 181. Id. § 11(c). 
 182. Id. § 11(b). 
 183. Id. § 11. 
 184. 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008).  
 185. Id. at 1405.  
 186. Id.  The Court expressed doubt as to whether the “manifest disregard of the law” 
(language the Court had used in an earlier opinion) could serve as a ground for vacating an 
award.  The Court suggested it was possible that the language had simply been intended to 
refer to some or all of the section 10 grounds collectively. Id. at 1404.  The Court recently 
passed on an opportunity to definitively state whether the “manifest disregard” standard 
survived Hall Street as an independent ground for review or as a judicial gloss on the 
grounds set forth in section 10. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 
1758, 1768 n.3 (2010). 
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a more limited way, the judicial “safety valve” function that the 
unconscionability doctrine is said to provide.187
None of this is to say that arbitrators may not assess the fairness or 
unconscionability of arbitration provisions.  The mandatory language of the 
FAA is not directed towards arbitrators but rather to courts.  And judicial 
hostility is the evil to be corrected by the FAA.  Thus, while 
unconscionability remains “the law,” that law is to be applied by arbitrators 
and not the courts. 
 
C.  Fraud, Duress, and Unconscionability:  The “Making of the Contract” 
Versus “What the Contract Is Made Of” 
As previously noted, the Court has twice grouped unconscionability with 
fraud and duress as “generally applicable contract defenses” that are 
permitted under section 2.188
Unconscionability differs from fraud and duress in important and 
relevant ways.  First, the contract defense of fraud is a question of fact,
  The Court may well be correct, but it does not 
follow that all three defenses are to be addressed by courts under section 4.  
While fraud and duress do fit, albeit uncomfortably, within section 4 (and 
hence may be addressed by courts), unconscionability does not. 
189 
as is the contract defense of duress.190  Accordingly, they are appropriately 
decided by the summary jury trial called for in section 4.  Conversely, 
unconscionability is a question of law for a court191
Second, fraud and duress are “all or nothing defenses,” while 
unconscionability is anything but.  The result of a successful claim of 
duress is either that no contract was formed (in the case of physical 
duress)
 and therefore is by 
definition outside the scope of such jury trial. 
192 or that the contract is voidable in its entirety (in the case of 
economic duress).193  Similarly, the result of a successful claim of fraud is 
either that no contract was formed (in the case of fraud in the execution)194
 
 187. See, e.g., Steinhardt v. Rudolph, 422 So. 2d 884, 890 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) 
(noting that unconscionability serves as a “safety valve” to enable courts to administer 
justice). See generally Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function, 
58 ALA. L. REV. 73 (2006) (arguing that unconscionability’s function as a safety valve to 
prevent contractual overreaching should be protected against trend towards formalism in the 
law). 
 
or that the contract is voidable in its entirety (in the case of other types of 
 188. See discussion supra Part I.C.2. 
 189. See, e.g., Chamberlain Livestock Auction, Inc. v. Penner, 462 N.W.2d 479, 481 
(S.D. 1990) (noting that the existence of fraud as a contract defense is a question of fact). 
 190. See, e.g., Premier Farm Credit, PCA v. W-Cattle, LLC, 155 P.3d 504, 521 (Colo. 
App. 2006) (noting that duress is generally a question of fact); Alexander v. Standard Oil 
Co., 368 N.E.2d 1010, 1016 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (same); Gainey v. Gainey, 675 S.E.2d 792, 
799 (S.C. Ct. App. 2009) (same). But see Comcast of Oregon II, Inc. v. City of Eugene, 155 
P.3d 99, 106 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (noting that the underlying facts of a defense of fraud, 
including whether the party claiming duress acted reasonably, is for the jury, but question of 
whether particular facts amount to duress is a question of law). 
 191. See supra notes 45–47, 68–70 and accompanying text. 
 192. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 174 (1982). 
 193. Id. § 175. 
 194. Id. § 163. 
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fraud and misrepresentation).195
Unconscionability, however, is quite different.  It is not an “all or 
nothing” defense.  Instead, the court is given a great deal of discretion in 
deciding how to proceed and has choices other than non-enforcement or full 
enforcement.  Under the U.C.C., for example, a court is specifically given 
discretion to refuse to enforce a contract, but may also “strike any single 
clause or group of clauses . . . or it may simply limit unconscionable clauses 
so as to avoid unconscionable results.”
  As a result, these defenses fit nicely into 
the FAA’s enforcement scheme—if the defense of fraud or duress fails then 
the arbitration agreement is enforced “according to the terms” of the 
agreement, and if the defense succeeds, then the agreement is not enforced 
at all. 
196  The common law provides this 
same discretion,197 and, indeed, even the earliest unconscionability cases 
were premised on the idea that a court could partially enforce a contract if 
necessary for justice.198
Third, fraud and duress both put at issue the making of the contract in a 
way that a claim of unconscionability does not.  As noted above, certain 
forms of fraud and duress go directly to the making of the contract.  Fraud 
in the execution and physical duress result in there being no contract at all, 
and thus plainly put the making of the contract at issue.  Other types of 
fraud and duress do not so directly put the making of the contract at issue, 
but they do result in a contract that is voidable at the election of the victim 
and in that sense go to whether the parties “really” made a mutually binding 
contract.
  Since the FAA is premised on courts applying all 
or nothing defenses only—enforcement on the terms of the agreement or 
not at all—there is a place in sections 3 and 4 for fraud and duress.  There is 
no such place for unconscionability. 
199  While unconscionability, at least in most jurisdictions, requires 
some analysis of the bargaining process, in all jurisdictions the substance of 
the terms is relevant.200
 
 195. Id. § 164. 
  Unlike unconscionability, duress and fraud do not 
generally depend on the substance of the contract or contract terms at issue.  
To establish a claim of fraud in the inducement requires showing that a 
“party’s manifestation of assent is induced by either a fraudulent or a 
material misrepresentation by the other party upon which the recipient is 
 196. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt.2 (2002). 
 197. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (noting that court has the ability to 
refuse enforcement of the contract, enforce the contract without the unconscionable clause, 
or limit the application of any unconscionable clause). 
 198. In what is considered one of the earliest cases on unconscionability, James v. 
Morgan, (1663) 83 Eng. Rep. 323 (K.B.), the court addressed the enforcement of a contract, 
the full enforcement of which would have resulted in the payment of an exorbitant price for a 
horse.  The court opted for limited enforcement, restricting the jury to an award of only a 
purchase price equal to the value of the horse. Id. 
 199. Cf. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403–04 (1967) 
(stating in dicta that a claim of fraud in the inducement directed against an arbitration 
provision goes to the making of the agreement to arbitrate and should be decided under 
section 4). 
 200. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
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justified in relying, the contract is voidable by the recipient.”201  The 
contents and substance of the contract itself are irrelevant; only the process 
by which the contract was made is relevant.  Similarly, a claim of non-
physical duress is made out and a contract is deemed voidable “[i]f a party’s 
manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat . . . that leaves the 
victim no reasonable alternative.”202
Finally, unconscionability is a rule of judicial discretion.  If a contract is 
unconscionable a court “may” refuse to enforce it, in whole or in part.
  The threat and the reasonableness of 
alternatives are relevant, but the substance of the contract is not.  This 
means, in theory, that a finder of fact could assess these defenses without 
knowing the substance of the contract and only the circumstances of the 
making of the contract.  This makes for reasonably good fit under section 4 
and reduces the danger of judicial “discrimination” against arbitration 
provisions since the substance of the contract is not legally relevant.  This is 
not at all true of unconscionability, in which the substance of the contract is 
a key and required consideration.  Thus, while fraud and duress go to the 
making of the contract (and hence belong in section 4), unconscionability 
goes to the very different question of what the contract is made of. 
203  
But fraud and duress are not discretionary.  If the elements of physical 
duress or fraud in the execution are established then the result is 
automatic—there is no contract.204  Similarly, non-physical duress and 
fraud in the inducement also leave nothing to judicial discretion—if the 
elements are satisfied then the contract becomes voidable.205
In sum, fraud and duress may be an uncomfortable fit with the FAA’s 
judicial enforcement scheme, but they do fit.  Unconscionability is quite 
different from those two doctrines—it is not a jury question, it is not an all 
or nothing defense, it does not go to the making of the contract, and it is 
largely a discretionary doctrine.  Unconscionability may fit within section 
2, but it does not fit within sections 3 and 4.  Therefore, the 
unconscionability of arbitration provisions should not be a question for the 
courts. 
  Unlike 
unconscionability, duress and fraud are (relatively) cabined and constrained 
doctrines and not doctrines of judicial discretion.  They are thus far less 
susceptible to being used as proxies for judicial hostility towards arbitration 
provisions. 
III.  ARBITRATORS AS ARBITERS OF GOOD ARBITRATION? 
In light of the conclusions set forth above, we are left with one final 
question:  in a world in which courts cannot use unconscionability to assess 
arbitration provisions, are the arbitrators themselves up to the task of 
policing arbitration agreements?  There is at least some reason to think the 
answer to this question is “yes.” 
 
 201. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(1). 
 202. Id. § 175(1). 
 203. U.C.C. § 2-302 (2002); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208. 
 204. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 174 (duress); id. § 163 (fraud). 
 205. See id. § 175(1) (duress); id. § 164(1) (fraud). 
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First, we should remember that we are all pretty new to this.  The 
widespread proliferation of arbitration provisions into consumer and 
employment contracts is a relatively recent phenomenon, as is the practice 
of drafting one-sided arbitration provisions.206
Under the current system, we leave it to arbitrators to assess 
unconscionability challenges to both the entire contract (including the 
arbitration provision) and each of the terms of a contract other than the 
arbitration provision itself (such as purchase price).  Only if a challenge is 
to the arbitration provision itself can the court assess the claim.
 
207
The Supreme Court in Jackson determined that arbitrators are capable of 
making determinations about the unconscionability of an arbitration 
agreement.  The Court made clear that parties can allocate the question of 
unconscionability of the arbitration agreement itself to the arbitrators.  The 
only issue that appears not subject to allocation is the very question of 
whether the allocation itself is unconscionable.
  There is 
some irony in trusting arbitrators to assess the fairness of all provisions in a 
contract except for the one type of provision they see most frequently and 
address on a regular basis. 
208
Individual arbitrators have found arbitration provisions 
unconscionable,
 
209 so at least we know the phenomenon is not merely an 
urban myth.  On a macro level, some of the large providers of arbitration 
have indeed responded to certain perceived abuses in the arbitration system.  
For instance, JAMS, a large provider of private arbitration services,210 has 
had a “Policy on Consumer Arbitrations Pursuant to Pre-Dispute Clauses” 
in effect since July 2009 that articulates “Minimum Standards on 
Procedural Fairness.”211  According to this policy, JAMS will administer a 
consumer arbitration only if the clause itself and the rules of arbitration 
called for by the clause meet certain minimum requirements.  These 
minimum standards include requirements that the arbitration agreement be 
binding on both parties,212 that all remedies that would be available to a 
consumer in litigation be available in arbitration,213 that the arbitrators be 
neutral (and that the consumer have some reasonable opportunity to 
participate in the selection process),214
 
 206. See supra notes 
 that the consumer have a right to an 
62–64 and accompanying text. 
 207. See discussion supra Part I.C.2. 
 208. See discussion supra Part I.C.2. 
 209. See, e.g., Labor Ready Nw., Inc. v. Crawford, No. 07-1060-HA, 2008 WL 1840749, 
at *2–4 (D. Or. Apr. 21, 2008) (noting that arbitrator had struck down arbitration provision 
that prohibited class actions); Smith v. Gateway, Inc., No. 03-01-00589-CV, 2002 WL 
1728615, at *1–2 (Tex. Ct. App. July 26, 2002) (noting that arbitrator had found 
unconscionable an arbitration provision prohibiting consequential, indirect, or punitive 
damages). 
 210. See infra note 225. 
 211. JAMS Policy on Consumer Arbitrations Pursuant to Pre-Dispute Clauses:  Minimum 
Standards of Procedural Fairness, JAMS:  THE RESOLUTION EXPERTS, 
http://www.jamsadr.com/consumer-arbitration (last visited Mar. 23, 2011). 
 212. Id. ¶ 1. 
 213. Id. ¶ 3. 
 214. Id. ¶ 4. 
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arbitration in the consumer’s “hometown area,”215 that costs be limited to 
$250,216 that discovery be allowed,217 and that the arbitrators’ award states 
finding and conclusions in writing.218
Similarly, the American Arbitration Association (AAA) established a 
National Consumer Disputes Advisory Committee designed to develop 
“standards and procedures for the equitable resolution of consumer 
disputes.”
  The JAMS policy responds well to 
many objections directed towards arbitration provisions. 
219  The committee articulated fifteen principles in the form of a 
Consumer Due Process Protocol.  The first principle in the protocol is that 
“[a]ll parties are entitled to a fundamentally-fair ADR process.”220  
Accordingly, other principles call for “a Neutral who is independent and 
impartial,”221 to an arbitration “of reasonable cost to [c]onsumers,”222 and 
to an arbitration at a “location which is reasonably convenient to both 
parties.”223  Although the Consumer Due Process Protocol does not itself 
set any rules, the recommendations are “likely to have a direct impact on 
the development of rules, procedures and policies for the resolution of 
consumer disputes under the auspices of the AAA.”224
Of course, the promulgation of guidelines by arbitration associations is 
not a complete cure.  First, even the noblest aspirations are not always fully 
realized.  Second, it is difficult to monitor whether an organization is in fact 
consistently applying its own standards.  Third, there is probably little 
recourse if such an organization ignores its standards.  And, of course, not 
every provider of alternative dispute resolutions has adopted standards like 
those of JAMS and the AAA (though these organizations are arguably the 
most significant providers of such services).
 
225
Although it may seem odd to provide an arbitrator with a power that a 
court is lacking, it is not at all inconsistent with the FAA.  First, the FAA is 
designed to correct the hostility that courts directed towards arbitration 
provisions.  The FAA, as previously discussed, was designed to undo rules 
by which courts refused to specifically enforce arbitration provisions and by 
  But the fact that two 
leading providers of arbitration services have taken it on themselves to 
articulate minimum standards of fairness is encouraging. 
 
 215. Id. ¶ 5. 
 216. Id. ¶ 7. 
 217. Id. ¶ 9. 
 218. Id. ¶ 10. 
 219. Consumer Due Process Protocol, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, 
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22019 (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) (Introduction:  Genesis of 
the Advisory Committee).  
 220. Id. (Principle 1). 
 221. Id. (Principle 3). 
 222. Id. (Principle 6). 
 223. Id. (Principle 7). 
 224. Id. (Introduction:  Genesis of the Advisory Committee). 
 225. JAMS describes itself as “the largest private alternative dispute resolution . . . 
provider in the world.” About JAMS, JAMS:  THE RESOLUTION EXPERTS, 
http://www.jamsadr.com/aboutus_overview/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).  The American 
Arbitration Association describes itself as the “nation’s largest full-service alternative 
dispute resolution . . . provider.” Dispute Resolution Services, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, 
http://www.adr.org/drs (last visited Mar. 1, 2011). 
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which courts permitted one party to back out of an arbitration agreement.226  
That is, it was designed “to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to 
arbitration agreements that had existed at the English common law and had 
been adopted by American courts.”227  The FAA has nothing to do with the 
power of an arbitrator to make an assessment of the grant of its own 
authority or whether the rules provided for in an arbitration agreement 
satisfy the arbitrator’s own standards.228  Second, the “mandatory” aspects 
of the FAA are not directed against arbitrators.  Thus, a court, upon 
determining that there is no issue regarding the making of the arbitration 
agreement or its scope, “shall make an order summarily directing the parties 
to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with the terms thereof.”229
I am not suggesting that the problem of overreaching arbitration 
provisions has been completely solved by the arbitrators.  But I am 
suggesting that they may be moving in the right direction and should be 
given an opportunity to address the problem. 
  It 
is the “court” that must issue the order and the court’s order is directed to 
the parties.  Nowhere is the behavior of the arbitrator subject to control, nor 
could it be. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that courts applying the unconscionability 
doctrine to arbitration provisions are not acting in a manner consistent with 
the FAA.  Congress took the judicial exercise of unconscionability off the 
table with the passage of the FAA and did so with good reason.  
Accordingly, even courts that consider arbitration provisions to be 
misbehaving “little monsters” must grit their teeth and treat such provisions 
like the “little darlings” Congress says they are.  The arbitral system should 
be given a chance to demonstrate that it can deal with the problem of 
overreaching arbitration provisions in a manner that is both effective and 
consistent with the FAA. 
 
 
 226. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
 227. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (emphasis added). 
 228. Cf. Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 939 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that 
senior vice president of the AAA had testified that system of “arbitration” established by an 
employer “so deviated from minimum due process standards that the [AAA] would refuse to 
arbitrate under those rules”). 
 229. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006). 
